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Abstract
The existing literature that estimates the incidence of arrears relies on either household
survey data or administrative data derived from the lender’s records of their borrowers. But
estimates based on these different sources will give different estimates of arrears. Moreover, the
estimates are not useful for policy analysis or for the bank’s lending decision, since they ignore the
fact some households do not borrow. This paper discusses the selection issues involved in using
either data source, and is the first paper to bound the estimate of the household’s underlying
propensity to repay. To demonstrate the methodology, it uses data from the EU-SILC survey
for 2008 to estimate the factors that affect repayment among Eurozone households.
Keywords: Manski Bounds, Consumer Credit, Arrears.
JEL classification: D14, K42, O17.
1 Introduction
Understanding the drivers of household repayment behaviour is a central question to researchers and
policy-makers. Several papers have investigated the determinants of repayment among households.
For example, Berkowitz and Hynes (1999), Domowitz and Sartain (1999), Fay, Hurst and White
(2002) look at bankruptcy filings among US households. Boheim and Taylor (2000), Bridges and
Disney (2004) and Duygan and Grant (2009) instead look at household survey data on arrears
from either the UK or from the EU. In these papers, whether the household defaults (or is in
arrears) is regressed against a set of explanatory variables. In contrast, Gross and Souleles (2002)
and Foote et al. (2010) both used the lender’s own records on borrowers to estimate arrears among
US households. An advantage of using administrative data provided by the lender is that it may
well be a more reliable estimate of arrears since the lender has incentives to keep accurate records
on default behaviour or arrears. However, using information on borrowers automatically excludes
households who either were refused credit, or did not apply for credit, and hence the results will
not, generally, be comparable to those obtained with survey data (e.g. a representative sample of
the entire household population). Grant and Padula (2013) and Karlan and Zinman (2009) also
use data from lender’s records, and are particularly interesting from a methodological view. These
two papers attempt to explore the fact that not all households will actually borrow. Karlan and
Zinman (2009) report results where the interest rate is randomly varied between households, and
show how default rates depend on the interest rate. Grant and Padula (2013) discuss the likely
behaviour of those households refused credit. However, a major weakness of these two papers is
that neither accounts for application behaviour. Dell’Arricia, Igan and Laeven (2012) also include
information on rejected households to investigate the decision to accept the loan. They further
noted that the characteristics of borrowers seems to have changed in the years prior to the financial
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crisis. However, they did not formally estimate a model of application behaviour, nor did they
estimate how this changing composition affected arrears. A key aim of this paper is to explain how
to estimate arrears in a way to properly account for both the borrowers decision to apply for credit,
and the lenders decision to give credit. That is, we will make explicit the assumptions underlying
existing estimates and how these assumptions affect the interpretation of the results. To the best
of our knowledge, this is the first paper to address both issues in an empirical model with the aim
of constructing an estimate of the underlying repayment behaviour of households.
Understanding repayment behaviour has important policy implications. Hitherto, there has
been much more research on US rather the European households. In particular, the recent sub-
prime mortgage crisis has revived the interest in household default behaviour and has demonstrated
the inability of large segments of the households population to repay their debts. Demyanyk and Van
Hemert (2011) show that the quality of sub-prime mortgage loans deteriorate in the six consecutive
years before the US sub-prime crises and argue that the boom of house prices between 2003 and
2005 contributed to conceal these trends. Foote, Gerardi and Willen (2008) show that negative
house-equity is a necessary but not sufficient condition to determine households mortgage default,
an argument also made by Campbell and Cocco (2011). Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2013) use
survey data to estimate the importance of strategic default on mortgages among US households
during the crisis (e.g. a change in the underlying arrears behaviour of households), while Mayer,
Pence and Sherland (2009), using data on the population of sub-prime loans, argue there was a
deterioration in lending standards.
Much of the US policy debate has emphasised that an important role is likely to be played by
the mortgage market institutions, for instance, see Campbell (2012). A related question is whether
the system of public guarantees caused the financial intermediaries to extend credit to households
otherwise deemed too risky households had the guarantees been absent. For example, Mian and
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Sufi (2009) argue that mortgage supply increased sharply in the US between 2002 and 2005; this
in itself is likely to cause an increase in the proportion of US households in arrears even if there
had been no change in the underlying repayment behaviour of borrowers. The question raises a
more general problem, relevant for secured as well as unsecured debt, that to understand arrears
one has first analyze the household decision to apply for a loan, and the lender decision to accord
the loan. This key problem is inadequately discussed throughout the existing literature, and is the
object of this paper. If some households do not apply for credit, or have their credit application
turned-down, then actual arrears will not capture the household’s underlying propensity to default.
Failing to account for this issue can cause both lenders and policy-makers to make flawed decisions
(and indeed, a major cause of the recent sub-prime crisis seems to have been an under-estimate
of the propensity to default of household types who previously did not have access to the credit
market). The aim of this paper is to explore how we might construct an estimate of the household
underlying propensity to default that accounts for the fact that not all households borrow. As
we will find, there are significant differences between households in different EU countries in their
underlying propensity to pay, and we believe this must have important implications for the design
of public policy.
For us to actually observe a household in arrears, three things must have happened: (i) the
household applies for a loan (or credit line); (ii) the loan is granted; (iii) the household fails to
repay the loan. Changes in actual level of arrears can result from changes in any of these three
processes. Existing studies of arrears that use household survey data to estimate changes in actual
arrears conflate steps (i)-(iii). They thus provide little insight into reasons for recent changes
in repayment behaviour, nor can such estimates be used to say anything about the underlying
repayment behaviour of households. Studies which rely on lender’s administrative data clearly
can not account for the application process. The key contribution of this paper is to disentangle
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effects (i)-(iii) and to provide a policy relevant estimate of repayment behaviour. It will develop a
methodology to help us understand the likely effect of policy interventions.
This paper focuses on the unsecured debt held by European households. Household debt in
Europe is a much smaller proportion of income compared to the US. Unsecured debt is 28 percent
of total household debt. The prevalence of arrears in the EU is lower than in the US, but there is
great heterogeneity between European countries. In Nordic countries, such as Sweden, Denmark
and the Netherlands the percentage of arrears is 3.5, 2.2 and 1.0, while in Mediterranean Europe
it ranges from 14.2 in Greece to 2.9 in Italy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the identification of three
relevant notions of propensity to default. Section 3 presents the estimators used to bound the iden-
tification regions. Section 4 describes the data; Section 5 illustrates the results; and the conclusions
are drawn in Section 6.
2 Identification
There is considerable confusion in the existing literature about what exactly is being estimated
when reporting the rate of arrears among households. There are at least three different concepts
of repayment that we may want to measure:
(i) The propensity to repay among those households given credit.
(ii) The propensity to repay among those households applying for credit.
(iii) The propensity to repay in the whole population of households.
The first of these items is the easiest and least controversial to estimate; it is simple to construct
from bank lending data. However, while this variable is crucial when assessing the bank’s capital
requirements (as per the Basel accord), it is less informative about the underlying behaviour of
households when policy changes. The bank would like to know about item (ii), which would enable
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it to understand which households can profitably be given credit and which households should be
refused. To be clear, the lender wants to know the propensity to repay among applicant households
and hence the likely repayment behaviour of an applicant household if that household is given
the loan. Obviously the bank does not observe the repayment behaviour of those households that
are refused. Nevertheless, given the lender’s administrative records, an estimate of item (ii) can
be constructed, and banks make considerable effort to estimate this item in order to make their
lending decision.
The last item in this list (the propensity to repay in the whole population) is the key estimate if
we are to understand how households react to changes in the policy environment. Most obviously,
an estimate of this item can only be constructed from survey data (e.g. a survey of the entire
household population), since it requires a random sample of the entire population which must
include households currently without credit. Moreover, whereas item (ii) requires some assessment
of the likely repayment behaviour of applicants who are refused credit, item (iii) additionally
requires an assessment of the repayment behaviour of those households that do not apply for
credit. Nevertheless, given survey data, an estimate of the propensity to default in the population
is possible.
However, in practise almost all papers, hitherto, have instead estimated the actual rate of re-
payment (or default) in the population (and how this changes with the household’s characteristics).
We assert that the distinction between the propensity to repay and actual repayment is important,
since changes in policies which influence the propensity to repay are likely also to affect the borrow-
ing and lending decision. Reducing the punishment for default or arrears, for instance, will likely
encourage lenders to refuse loan applications as well as encourage borrowers to apply for credit;
making the effect on the actual rate of repayment observed in the population unclear.
To proceed, we need to formalize the insights above about what precisely is being estimated
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when arrears is analyzed. First define the variables R, C and A as binary, {0, 1}, indicators for
whether the loan is paid on schedule, whether the loan is given and whether the loan is applied for.
That is we define:
R = 1l {The loan is repaid on schedule}
C = 1l {The loan is given}
A = 1l {The loan is applied for}
The policy relevant variable of interest is R, which we want to model using a sample of i = 1, . . . , N
households where for each household we observe some characteristics Xi ∈ R
q. That is, we want
to construct an estimate of Pr(R = 1|X = x), and how it changes as the characteristics X change.
As an aside, estimating arrears is equivalent to estimating repayment, since arrears arise when the
household does not repay on schedule, and hence it equals 1−R.
2.1 Estimates Using Survey Data
There are a number of estimates of the repayment behaviour of households, currently available in
the literature such as Berkowitz and Hynes (1999) or Duygan and Grant (2009). These estimates
either use survey data (a representative sample of households from some underlying population,
such as the EU or US population), or they use data that has been made available from a lender’s
credit records. Those studies that have used survey data have regressed the incidence of default (or
arrears) against a variety of explanatory variables. Clearly, a household will only be observed to be
in default or arrears, if the household is borrowing. That is, if it has both applied for credit, and the
application for credit has been accepted. This reduced form estimate will clearly not capture the
underlying propensity to repay of the household, since it ignores the decision to borrow, and ignores
the decision to lend. Noting that those households that repay on schedule are those households not
in arrears, we can write the underlying propensity to repay as made up of the propensity to repay
if the households is borrowing, and the propensity to repay if it is not, where a household might
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not borrow either because its credit application has been refused (presumably because it has been
judged a bad credit risk), or because it does not want to borrow. Formally, this can be written as:
Pr(R = 1|X = x) = Pr(R = 1|C = 1, A = 1,X = x) · Pr(C = 1, A = 1|X = x)
+ Pr(R = 1|C = 0, A = 1,X = x) · Pr(C = 0, A = 1|X = x)
+ Pr(R = 1|A = 0,X = x) · Pr(A = 0|X = x)
(1)
Clearly a problem exists because neither Pr(R = 1|C = 0, A = 1,X = x) (the propensity to repay
among households refused credit), nor Pr(R = 1|A = 0,X = x) (the propensity to repay among
those households who do not apply for credit), can be directly estimated from data.
Equation 1 also make clear an important point (for which it is easier to write the estimate
for default rather than repayment). The naive estimate of default delivers the sample analog of
Pr(R = 0, C = 1, A = 1|X = x) which equals Pr(R = 0|C = 1, A = 1,X = x) · Pr(C = 1, A =
1|X = x). This will be informative of Pr(R = 0|X = x), the propensity to default, only in the
special case in which Pr(A = 1|X = x) = Pr(C = 1|A = 1,X = x) = 1. Nevertheless it is the
implicit assumption common to all papers which use an estimate of the incidence of actual default
to make statements about the underlying propensity to default.
In other words, the existing literature estimates the observed incidence of default or arrears,
where clearly only those households who are actually borrowing, for which both C = 1 and A = 1,
can default. These estimates ignore the selection process and can not be interpreted as a structural
parameter unless it is assumed that no household that is not currently borrowing would have
defaulted (or been in arrears) should it have been borrowing. That is, the reduced form estimate
will equal the structural estimate as long as we make the following assumption:
Assumption 1 For each X = x, the probability of the loan being repaid on schedule, given that
either no loan application is made, or the loan application is rejected, is 1, i.e.:
Pr(R = 1|A = 0,X = x) = Pr(R = 1|C = 0, A = 1,X = x) = 1.
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If this assumption is made then the underlying propensity to repay Pr(R = 1|X = x) can be
replaced by θn(x) where:
θn(x) = Pr(R = 1|C = 1, A = 1,X = x)Pr(C = 1|A = 1,X = x)Pr(A = 1|X = x)
+ [1− Pr(C = 1|A = 1,X = x)]Pr(A = 1|X = x) + [1− Pr(A = 1|X = x)]
This estimate allows us to recover how the propensity to repay changes with household character-
istics as long as the composition of borrowers does not change.
We believe that assumption 1 is implausible, and thus naive estimates of the propensity to repay
that calculate θn(x) will be misleading if they are interpreted as structural parameters. That is,
we do not believe estimates of θn(x) can be useful for policy analysis, since such estimates will not
enable us to understand household arrears when there are changes in the composition of borrowers;
and in particular if policy-variables change.
2.2 Estimates Using Lender Records
An alternate approach to investigating which factors affect repayment has used administrative
data supplied by the lender (see, for example, Gross and Souleles, 2002). This approach estimates
repayment using the sample of credit applicants. In this approach the decision by the household is
either ignored (or viewed as unimportant) or the object of interest is the repayment behaviour of
credit applicants. In the second case, the researcher typically wishes to recover:
Pr(R = 1|A = 1,X = x) = Pr(R = 1|C = 1, A = 1,X = x) · Pr(C = 1|A = 1,X = x)
+ Pr(R = 1|C = 0, A = 1,X = x) · Pr(C = 0|A = 1,X = x) (2)
where the decision to grant credit to the applicant, and the repayment behaviour of households given
credit is observed. However the repayment behaviour of refused applicants is not observed. Often
attention is restricted to those applicants granted credit, and the propensity to default is estimated
on this sample hence the object of interest (the probability of repayment among applicants) is
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replaced by
Pr(R = 1|C = 1, A = 1,X = x) (3)
Estimates of 3 are sometimes used by banks to construct borrowers’ credit scores. A more so-
phisticated credit scoring algorithm tries to estimate Pr(R = 1|X = x,A = 1), which requires
that some estimate of the behaviour of the rejected loan applications needs to be made. Many
lenders solve this problem by giving a small sample of households the loan even though they are
rejected by the credit scoring algorithm, enabling the lender can construct the sample analogue of
Pr(R = 1|C = 0, A = 1,X = x) (the probability of repayment among applicants denied credit).
Lenders have sometimes made this ‘experimental’ data available for academic research (see Karlan
and Zinman, 2009 for example).
Given that lending to candidates who would normally be rejected can be costly, as such house-
holds are usually worse credit risks, lenders do not want to estimate Pr(R = 1|C = 0, A = 1,X = x)
for more choices of x and for more observations than is strictly necessary. An alternative approach to
the problem is to explicitly model the decision to grant the loan. For example, Boyes, Hoffman, and
Low (1989) and Jacobson and Roszbach (2003) both obtained estimates of Pr(R = 1|X = x,A = 1)
in a fully parametric setting by constructing a bivariate Probit model where the probability of the
household getting the loan and the probability of arears were jointly estimated. Identification in
these models, however, requires imposing one-or-more exclusion restrictions: variables that affect
whether the lender provides the loan, but not whether it is repaid. (The importance of exclusion
restrictions was not fully recognized when these papers were published, as both Boyes, Hoffman,
and Low (1989) and Jacobson and Roszbach (2003) obtained identification from the functional
form of the probit equations.) However, non-parametric identification requires exclusion restric-
tions, for which there needs to be some economic rational. As argued by Grant and Padula (2013),
a lender would only include a variable in the credit scoring decision (which decides whether the
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loan is granted) if it also explains arrears. Hence any choice of exclusion restriction is ipso facto
incompatible with optimal behaviour by the lender.
Grant and Padula (2013) proposed using bounds to solve the identification problem. They
noted that while Pr(R = 1|C = 0, A = 1,X = x) is not observed, it must be bounded between zero
and one, thus (following the approach described in Manski, 1989 and Manski, 1990) a lower bound
and an upper bound can be placed on the true value of Pr(R = 1|A = 1,X = x) (the repayment
behaviour of credit applicants). The lower bound and upper bounds are defined as:
θbl (x) = Pr(R = 1|C = 1, A = 1,X = x) · Pr(C = 1|A = 1,X = x)
θbu(x) = θ
b
l (x) + [1− Pr(C = 1|A = 1,X = x)]
These bounds can be tightened if we are prepared to make the following reasonable assumption.
Assumption 2 For each X = x, the probability that the loan is repaid on schedule, given that the
loan application is refused, is no better than the probability that the loan is repaid on schedule, given
that the loan is granted, i.e.:
Pr(R = 1|C = 0, A = 1,X = x) ≤ Pr(R = 1|C = 1, A = 1,X = x).
This assumption (2) is made in Grant and Padula (2013), and gives an economic rationale for
implementing the monotone treatment selection assumption discussed in Manski and Pepper (2000).
By making this assumption, a tightened upper bound can be derived, where:
θbtu(x) = Pr(R = 1|C = 1, A = 1,X = x)
The true estimate of repayment among applicant households must lie somewhere between the lower
and the tightened upper bound. Note, however, that neither the estimate from experimental data,
nor the estimate using the bounds construct the policy relevant estimate of the propensity to
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default; the estimate which controls both for whether a credit application is made, and for whether
credit is granted.
2.3 An estimate of the underlying propensity to repay
An important aim of this study is to construct an estimate of Pr(R = 1|X = x), which no paper
has hitherto estimated. The probability of the loan being repaid on schedule given X = x can be
written as:
Pr(R = 1|X = x) = Pr(R = 1|C = 1, A = 1,X = x) · Pr(C = 1, A = 1|X = x)
+ Pr(R = 1|C = 0, A = 1,X = x) · Pr(C = 0, A = 1|X = x)
+ Pr(R = 1|A = 0,X = x) · Pr(A = 0|X = x)
= Pr(R = 1|A = 1,X = x) · Pr(A = 1|X = x) (4)
+ Pr(R = 1|A = 0,X = x) · Pr(A = 0|X = x)
We have shown in Section 2.2 how to bound Pr(R = 1|A = 1,X = x). The sampling process does
not disclose the sample analog of Pr(R = 1|A = 0,X = x), but we know that it belongs to the
interval [0, 1]. Therefore, we can construct a lower bound and an upper bound to Pr(R = 1|X = x),
and do not make assumption 2. These bounds are, respectively:
θl(x) = Pr(R = 1|C = 1, A = 1,X = x) Pr(C = 1|A = 1,X = x) Pr(A = 1|X = x)
θu(x) = Pr(R = 1|C = 1, A = 1,X = x) Pr(C = 1|A = 1,X = x) Pr(A = 1|X = x)
+ [1− Pr(C = 1|A = 1,X = x)] Pr(A = 1|X = x) + [1− Pr(A = 1|X = x)]
These bounds are wider than in the previous section, where we discussed what is estimated when
using data provided by the lender and/or the estimate is restricted to using data only from those
households who apply for credit. In practise these bounds can be rather too wide to be practically
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useful. Nevertheless, simple economic assumptions can be used to tighten these bounds. For
example, by using assumption 2 the upper bound can be tightened to where
θtu(x) = Pr(R = 1|A = 1, C = 1,X = x) · Pr(A = 1|X = x) + [1− Pr(A = 1|X = x)] (5)
We would also like to tighten the lower bound. A simple and intuitive assumption that can do this
is to assume that households who apply for loans are weakly less likely to repay than households
who do not, i.e. Pr(R = 1|A = 0,X = x) ≥ Pr(R = 1|A = 1,X = x). In which case the
lower bound will be the same as the lower bound used for the estimate using applicant data only.
An alternative assumption, which can also be used to create a tightened lower bound, compares
households who do not apply for a loan with those who are given a loan.
Assumption 3 For each X = x, the propensity to repay the loan on schedule by households where
no loan application is made, is at least as good as the propensity to repay the loan on schedule,
given that an application is made and the household is given credit, i.e.:
Pr(R = 1|A = 0,X = x) ≥ Pr(R = 1|C = 1, A = 1,X = x).
In this case the new tightened lower bound becomes
θtl(x) = Pr(R = 1|C = 1, A = 1,X = x)·
{Pr(C = 1|A = 1,X = x) Pr(A = 1|X = x) + [1− Pr(A = 1|X = x)]} (6)
These new bounds considerably tighten the between which the true value of Pr(R = 1|X = x)
can lie. Moreover, these bounds rely on simple and plausible economic assumptions about the
behaviour of borrowers and lenders.
While restricting the borrowers and lenders behaviour in an arguably reasonable way, assump-
tions 2 and 3 involve quantities that are typically unobserved by the econometrician and therefore
cannot be tested, whatever the data generating mechanism. The data typically do not disclose the
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propensity to repay among those who do not apply for credit or among those who apply for and
are not granted credit. Furthermore, it is not obvious how experimental data can be used to obtain
the sample analogs of Pr(R = 1|C = 0, A = 1,X = x) and Pr(R = 1|A = 0,X = x); generally,
experiments do not allow us to observe the repayment behaviour of someone who is not granted
credit or of someone who does not apply for credit.
However, it is worth emphasizing that virtually all papers estimating Pr(R = 1|X = x) from
either representative samples of the entire population or lender data make even stronger assumptions
than assumptions 2 and 3. To estimate Pr(R = 1|X = x) from data on actual repayment, one has
to assume that the propensity to default is the same between those who are given credit and those
who are not, and those who apply and those who do not. In most of the existing literature, these
assumptions are made implicitly without being clearly stated. Moreover, while being useful in that
they allow the econometrician to obtain a point estimate of Pr(R = 1|X = x), these assumptions
clearly neglect important aspects of the lending and the borrowing decisions; they are in many
contexts implausible and are not tested. Our approach here is twofold. On the one hand, we make
these assumptions transparent and clarify their role in identifying Pr(R = 1|X = x) from observed
actual arrears behaviour. On the other hand, by relaxing these assumptions we show how far our
inferences on Pr(R = 1|X = x) can go.
3 Estimation
The data comprises of a sample S of N i.i.d. observations. For each observation i we observe a
set of explanatory variables Xi. The data also reports a set of binary variables: Ri (a dummy that
takes the value one if the household repays the loan and zero if it defaults); Ci (a dummy that
takes the value one if the household receives the loan and zero if it is refused); and Ai (a dummy
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that takes the value one if the household applies for a loan and zero if it does not). However, the
value of these binary variables is not always observed by the econometrician. In particular while
Ai is observed for all i’s; Ci is observed only for those i ∈ SA ⊂ S such that Ai = 1; and Ri is
observed only for those i ∈ SR ⊂ SA such that Ci = 1 and Ai = 1.
Given what is observed we can construct the sample estimate of the probability of repay-
ing on schedule among households given the loan Pr (R = 1|C = 1, A = 1,X = x); the probabil-
ity of receiving the loan Pr (C = 1|A = 1,X = x); and the probability of applying for the loan
Pr (A = 1|X = x).
Given data from the lender the econometrician observes whether a household repays if it has
been given a loan, and whether the household has received the loan. We can divide households into
four groups: those household that repay (for which R = 1 and C = 1 and A = 1); those households
that do not repay (for which R = 0 and C = 1 and A = 1); those households who are refused credit
(where C = 0 and A = 1 but there is a missing value for R); and those households that do not
apply for credit (where A = 0 and both R and C are missing).
The naive estimate θn(x) is found by assuming all household who are refused the loan would
have repaid (households in the third and fourth group are put together with the households that
repay and are given a value of one). That is we can construct
Rn =
{
1 if R = 1 or C = 0 or A = 0
0 if R = 0 and C = 1 and A = 1
which will be defined on the whole sample S. Using this sample, we can estimate Pr (Rn = 1|X = x)
to obtain the naive estimate of the probability of default.
The bank upper bound θbu(x) and the bank lower bound θ
b
l (x) can also be found assuming all
households refused the loan would have repaid (for the upper bound) or would have defaulted (for
the lower bound). Equivalently, these two estimates are constructed by dropping the fourth group
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(keeping only those households that applied for credit) and placing all households in the third group
with the first group (for the upper bound) or with the second group (for the lower bound):
Rbu =
{
1 if R = 1 or C = 0
0 if R = 0 and C = 1
Rbl =
{
1 if R = 1 and C = 1
0 if R = 0 or C = 0
which are only defined for the sample SA. Using this sample, we can estimate Pr
(




Rbl = 1|X = x
)
to obtain the estimates of θbu(x), the bank upper bound, and θ
b
l (x), the
bank lower bound of the probability of default. The bank tightened upper bound θbtu(x) is found
by estimating default among those who receive the loan for which we observe the actual arrears
behaviour (the sample SR).
The upper and the lower bounds θl(x) and θu(x) can be estimated by assuming all households
in the third and the fourth group are placed with the first and the second group. That is, we create
two new variables Ru and Rl where
Ru =
{
1 if R = 1 or C = 0 or A = 0
0 if R = 0 and C = 1 and A = 1
Rl =
{
1 if R = 1 and C = 1 and A = 1
0 if R = 0 and C = 0 or A = 0
Using the whole sample S (for which bothRu andRl are defined), we can estimate Pr (Ru = 1|X = x)
and Pr (Rl = 1|X = x) to obtain the estimates of the upper and the lower bound of the underlying
propensity to default of households.
Overall, we have a number of objects we need to estimate. While the bounds can be esti-
mated using a fully parametric estimator such as a Probit or Logit estimator, we instead follow
the procedure of Blundell, Gosling, Ichimura, and Meghir (2007), and estimate the bounds non-
parametrically using the Nadaraya-Watson kernel estimator. For illustrating the approach, let us
focus on the naive estimate of default θn, for which we estimate E(Rn|X = x) using the whole
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sample S (assume that X is continuous). The Nadaraya-Watson estimator is defined as:
∑
j 6=iRnjI(xj ∈ Xn)K([xi − xj ]/an)
∑
j 6=i I(xj ∈ Xn)K([xi − xj ]/an)
where I(·) is the indicator function for whether the jth observation is in the Xn neighbourhood,
K(·) is the Gaussian kernel function, Xn = {x s.t. ||x− x
′|| ≤ 2an for some x
′ ∈ X} and an is
positive, tends to zero and is chosen through cross-validation (see Härdle, Hall, Marron, 1988).
The other bounds (and all the other objects of interest) are estimated in a similar way. We can
construct the variances of the kernel estimators using Bowman and Azzalini (1997) (see also Pagan
and Ullah, 1999). We also provide 95 percent confidence regions around the bounds, using the
variances of the kernel estimates.
Unfortunately, unlike the other objects to be estimated, no simple transformation of R exists
to capture the tightened upper bound θtu(x), and the tightened lower bound θtl(x). Instead, it
is necessary to construct these bounds from the estimate of Pr (R = 1|C = 1, A = 1,X = x) using
the sample SR; the estimate of Pr (C = 1|A = 1,X = x) using the sample SA; and the estimate of
Pr (A = 1|X = x) using the whole sample S. Given these estimates we construct θtu(x) and θtl(x)
using 5 and 6. The standard errors of these estimates are constructed by bootstrapping using 200
iterations.
4 Data
The data used in this paper is taken from the European Union Survey of Income and Living
Conditions (EU-SILC). This dataset is a representative survey of households in each participating
European household. The survey has been asked each year since 2004 and is designed to replace
the European Community Household Survey (ECHP), which was discontinued in 2003. Each year
the survey asks identical questions in each of the participating European countries, thus facilitating
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cross-country comparison of household behaviour. The survey asks a number of questions about the
household’s composition, housing, income and labour market participation, and living conditions
(including a number of questions about poverty and social exclusion). The survey has both a cross-
sectional component and a rotating panel component (with households included for four years
before being replaced).
While the focus of the survey is on income, each year also includes an additional module of
questions on an issue of contemporary interest. In 2008 the module of additional questions was titled
Module on over-indebtedness and financial exclusion and focused on debts, arrears, repayments and
those who do not have access to credit. This paper exploits these questions, asked only in 2008,
to focus on the determinants of repayment behaviour of households in those European countries
included in the 2008 survey. Note that the recent financial crisis began around this year; the results
may have been very different if we had data for other years. While a small number of questions
on debt and arrears are included in the main survey each year, those questions are far less detailed
and focus only on arrears on housing and on utility payments, excluding all other types of loan, as
well as questions on financial exclusion, which does not allow the analysis attempted in this paper.
In the 2008 wave of the questionnaire, the household was asked about debts on utility bills,
rent, credit card, hire purchase and other bank loans (including overdrafts), and mortgages. For
each kind of debt, the survey asked “in the last 12 months, has it happened that your household was
unable to make a repayment on this loan on time”. These arrears are self-reported and may thus
be under-reported. Moreover, we do not observe the extent of the arrears, which may well cover a
wide range of different behaviour. At one extreme these households may be entering bankruptcy;
at the other the household may be only a few days late on a due payment and have subsequently
remedied the situation. Our analysis is not able to distinguish between these two extremes, and
this should be kept in mind throughout.
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As well as asking about arrears, and whether the household has a loan, the 2008 wave of the
survey asks households that do not currently have a loan about why they are not borrowing. Each
non-borrowing household reports either that it did not want to borrow; or that it has made an
application for credit which has been refused (although the question specified no time frame).
Our methodology will exploit this piece of information to construct the bounds to the underlying
propensity to default.
This paper concentrates on those countries that were in the Eurozone in 2008, eliminating all
other households from the sample. It also restricts attention to households where the household
head was between the ages of 30 and 60. Self-employed households are removed since we wish
to concentrate on households borrowing to smooth consumption, rather than borrowing for other
purposes. Only single households and those households headed by a couple (whether married or not)
are included, hence excluding households with multiple unrelated adults (since in such households
it is unclear who is responsible for any loan or its repayment). The sample also excluded those
households with incomplete information. After making these selections, there are 47,880 households
included in the analysis.
An important variable included in the analysis is income, measured as total household labour
market income and transfers less taxes on income. Beyond information on income and arrears, the
survey also measures a number of household and individual characteristics; our regression analysis
will include whether the household is headed by a couple, whether the household head went to
university, and whether the household self-reports that they suffered what they believed was a
substantial fall in income over the last year. The panel component of the survey, which excludes
the key questions used in our analysis, shows that on average incomes fell by 633 euros for those
reporting a fall, but increased by 877 euros if they did not. Table 1 provides the mean and the
standard deviation for our main variables of interest for the whole sample (which includes those
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households who do not borrow), as well as for the sub-samples of those borrowers who repay on
schedule and those who report arrears The data shows there are some differences between the
groups. Households who repay on schedule are richer than the average household in the sample;
are more likely to have attended university, and are more likely to be a couple. Households in
arrears, in contrast, have much lower income, are slightly younger, are less likely to be in a couple
or to have attended university, and are much more likely to report that their income has fallen
substantially. The regression analysis below will explore these differences in more detail.
The bottom panel of table 1 reports the percentage of households in the whole population who
apply for a loan, who are given a loan, and who end up reporting they are in arrears. The table
shows that 74.4 percent of households in the sample report that they apply for a loan, and that
most (but not all) such households will end up borrowing. Given that 71.8 percent of households
have a loan this means 96.4 percent of applicants have their loan accepted. The table also shows
that 6.9 percent of households end up reporting arrears (this is 9.6 percent of households who
borrow).
5 Results
The results are obtained through kernel regressions where the bandwidth has been chosen by cross-
validation. Each of the regressions includes income, age, whether the household is in a couple,
whether the household head graduated from university, and whether the household self-reports it
suffered a significant fall in income over the last year as explanatory variables. Separate results
have been estimated for the naive estimate (which assumes all non-borrowers would have repaid),
the lender’s estimate (which excludes non-borrowers), and the policy estimate (which accounts for
whether the household applies for credit and for whether credit is given). The main text will report
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the results for three of the largest Eurozone countries (Germany, Spain and Italy) while a further
nine Eurozone countries have their results discussed in the additional supporting material (although
briefly summarised in the main text).
5.1 A Naive Estimate of Repayment
In this section we provide the naive estimate of repayment, which are obtained assuming that all
non-borrowers would have repaid. The left-hand side of figure 1 presents the results for age for
Germany, Spain and Italy. It plots age on the horizontal axis and the percentage of households
that repay on the vertical axis. The estimates for age are obtained by holding income and the
other variables at the median of their Eurozone distribution, and calculating the estimated rate of
repayment for household heads between the ages of 30 and 60. For each estimate, a 95 percent
coverage region (or confidence interval) was estimated, between which the true estimate must lie;
the confidence interval has been plotted with dashed lines.
The results show that the rate of repayment typically increases with age. In Germany (the
top-left panel), the oldest households are over 2 percent more likely to repay than middle-aged
households, who are in turn nearly 3 percent more likely to repay than the youngest households
(and these differences are statistically significant). The differences across age-groups in Spain
(middle-left) are slightly larger: young Spanish households are over 3 percent less likely to repay
than middle-aged households, and nearly 5 percent less likely to repay than the oldest households.
In Italy, in contrast, there is no significant difference in the incidence of arrears between middle-aged
households and the youngest households. However, those households aged 60 are over 1 percent
more likely to repay than households aged 45. The results in the additional supporting material
show that there are also differences in the repayment behaviour of households across age-groups in
many other Eurozone countries.
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The effect of income, shown on the right-hand side of figure 1, are calculated for a household
aged 45 (with the other characteristics held at their Eurozone median), with the estimated level of
repayment calculated at every 10th centile of the Eurozone income distribution from the 10th to
the 90th decile, with additional estimates at the 5th and the 95th decile of the Eurozone income
distribution (making 11 income points in the distribution). For each estimate, a 95 percent coverage
region (or confidence interval) was estimated, between which the true estimate must lie, and plotted
with dashed lines. Using the same income points in all Eurozone countries facilitates the easy
comparison of these estimates across countries.
For the naive estimates, which assumes all non-borrowers would have repaid if they had had a
loan, there are large and significant differences across all income groups. Middle income households
in Germany are nearly 15 percent more likely to repay than those German households at the bottom
of the Eurozone income distribution, but over 2 percent less likely to repay than households at the
top of the distribution. The differences in Italy are smaller; the richest households are 9 percent
less likely to experience arrears than the poorest households. In Spain, the poorest households
are significantly different from both middle income households (which are 3 percent more likely to
repay) and high income households (which are 4 percent more likely to repay), but middle income
and high income households are not significantly different from each other. The results reported in
the additional supporting material shows that, for all the other countries included in the analysis,
older households are significantly more likely to repay their debts than younger households. Overall,
these results show that there are dramatic differences in the effect of income across countries.
Table 2 reports the effect of couple, university, and the self-reported income shock for Germany,
Italy and Spain. Couple is not significant any of these three countries, nor in most of the countries
included in the additional supporting material. The exceptions, in which couple is significant,
are Belgium, Finland, and Portugal. University, in contrast, is significant in each of the three
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countries included in table 2. University reduces repayment in Germany by nearly 2 percent,
by over 1 percent in Italy, and by 1 percent in Spain. The results in the additional supporting
material shows that university is also significant in most other Eurozone countries: only in Finland,
Netherlands, Luxembourg and Austria is it not significant. The results reported there show that
it raises repayment by 3 percent in Belgium, and Ireland, by nearly 7 percent in Greece, and by
2.5 percent on Slovenia. However, University educated households are 3 percent more likely to be
in arrears in Portugal.
The self-reported income shock reduces repayment in every country included in the analysis,
and the reported effects are often large. For example, table 2 shows that the income shock reduces
repayment in Germany by over 5.5 percent and by nearly 7 percent in Spain. The smallest effect is
in Italy, where it reduces repayment by 4 percent. The results are similar in the additional countries
included supporting material where the largest effect is in Finland at over 16 percent, while the
smallest effects are in Greece, Portugal and Slovenia, where the self-reported income shock reduces
repayment by around 5 percent.
5.2 The Estimate of Repayment Among Borrowers
In this section, we estimate the drivers of repayment if credit is given by the lender (e.g. the sample
of borrowers; the type of data which is typically available from lenders’ administrative records).
The results for age are reported on the left-hand-side in figure 2. The first thing to notice is that
the rate of repayment among households given the loan is estimated to be lower than the naive
estimate (which assumed all non-borrowers would have repaid their loan). For example, at age 30,
the estimated repayment rate of German households is 91.7 percent in the naive estimate, but is
89.4 percent for the estimate that only includes current borrowers. The other countries (including
those reported in the supporting material) show a similar pattern. However, although the estimates
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are lower than for the naive estimates, they nevertheless otherwise show a very similar pattern.
In Germany, the young are nearly 4 percent less likely to repay than middle-age households,
which are over 3 percent less likely to repay than the oldest households in the survey. Austria
is very similar to Germany whereby households aged 30 are 3 percent less likely to repay than
45-year-old households, who are over 2 percent less likely to repay than 60 year-old households. In
Spain, the effect of age is larger between young and middle-aged households at nearly 3 percent, but
smaller between middle-aged and older households, at under 2 percent. Finally, in Italy, there is no
significant difference between age groups. The results for the countries reported in the additional
supporting material show a similar range of effects. The largest effects are in Finland, where the
difference between the oldest and youngest households is 9.5 percent, and in Slovenia, where the
difference is nearly 7 percent. In contrast, there are no statistically significant differences across
age-groups in Luxembourg, Ireland or Portugal.
The effect of income on repayment for the different Eurozone countries is shown in the right-
hand side of figure 2. The results show that there are large differences across income groups,
and again the differences are slightly larger when using borrower records compared to the naive
estimates in figure 1. In all three countries in figure 2, high income households are significantly
more likely to repay than middle-income households, who are, in turn, significantly more likely
to repay than low-income households (those at the 10th Eurozone income centile). But while the
differences in rates of repayment across income groups are significant, the size of the effect differs
between countries. For example, in Germany, the rate of repayment among the lowest income
households is 20 percent lower than middle-income households which are over 4 percent lower than
among the highest income German households. While in Spain, the lowest income households are
nearly 6 percent less likely to repay than middle income households, and 7 percent less likely to
repay than the highest income households. The effect of income in Italy is much larger where the
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poorest are nearly 22 percent less likely to repay than middle income households, which are over
4 percent less likely to repay than the highest income households.
The countries included in the supplementary material also show similar income effects. The
Netherlands, Belgium, Greece and Austria also show significant differences between high and
middle-income groups and between middle-income and low income groups: the differences be-
tween the high and low income groups is between 17.5 percent and 21 percent. Differences across
income groups are also significant in Finland, and at 31 percent, are considerably larger. In both
Portugal and Slovenia, there are significant differences between the poorest and middle-income
households, but these middle income households are not statistically different from higher income
households (and the overall difference across income groups is smaller than for the other countries).
Finally, in Luxembourg and Ireland, high income households are more likely to repay than middle
and low income households, with the overall difference between high and low income households of
8.5 percent in Luxembourg, and 5 percent in Ireland.
The second column of table 2 shows the effect of couple is not significant in Germany, Spain
or Italy, but that the effect of university, while small, is significant (it increases repayment by only
1.5 percent in Spain). The effect of the income shock on repayment among borrowers is significant
in all three countries and the size of this effect is typically quite large. In Germany, Spain and Italy,
experiencing an income shock significantly increase the incidence of arrears by around 7 percent.
The supporting material shows the results are mostly similar in the other Eurozone countries.
Except in Greece, the effect of university is small (and is not significant in Finland and Austria);
while the effect of the income shock is typically larger, in Finland, Ireland, and the Benelux countries
it increases by over 10 percent (again Greece is the exception, with the income shock having no
effect). While couple has no effect in most countries, it is significant in Belgium, Finland, Greece
and Portugal.
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5.3 The Estimate of Repayment Among Applicants
The bank, when it makes its lending decision, wishes to understand the propensity to default among
applicants. When deciding on whether to give a loan when an application has been made, the lender
needs to know their likely repayment behaviour. This means that the estimate must account for
the fact that some applicants are not given credit. Estimates of the bank upper bound, bank
tightened upper bound, and the bank lower bound are reported in the third-fifth columns of table 2
and the results shown in figure 3. The upper bound assumes all refused credit applicants would
have repaid while the lower bound assumes they would have been in arrears: the true estimate
must lie somewhere between these two estimates. By assuming that those households whose credit
application was rejected are weakly less likely to repay than those households whose application
was accepted, we can construct the tightened bank upper bound θbtu(x). If this assumption is
satisfied then the true propensity to repay among credit applicants must instead lie between θbtu(x)
and θbl (x). These bounds have been drawn with solid lines in the figures (the upper and tightened
upper bounds are often close together). Since these bounds have been estimated, we have also
drawn the 95 percent coverage region with a dashed line in these figures. For the upper bound and
the tightened upper bound, the dashed line is above the solid line, while for the lower bound the
dashed line is below the solid line, hence the 95 percent coverage region is wider than the point
estimates of the bounds (the distance between the solid lines).
The effect of age on the propensity to repay among credit applicants is shown in the left-
hand side of figure 3. In most countries the upper bound and the tightened upper bound are
quite close together, which suggests that assumption 2 does not have much affect on the estimates
(although in some cases it will cause the results to become significant). In Germany the estimates
are only significantly different when comparing the very youngest households aged 30 with the
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oldest households aged 60. The size of the effect can calculated by looking at θbtu(x)− θ
b
l (x) at the
different ages. The lower number is the smallest difference we can construct (taking the difference
between θbtu(x) at age 30 and θ
b
l (x) at age 60), while the higher number is the largest difference we
can construct (taking the difference between θbl (x) at age 30 and θ
b
tu(x) at age 60). For Germany,
this exercise suggests that households aged 30 are between 4.6 and 8.3 percent less likely to repay
than households aged 60. In Spain, young households are significantly different from middle-aged
households, which are significantly different from the oldest households. In contrast, there are no
significant differences between Italian households at different ages. But this is not surprising, since
age was not significant when attention was restricted to borrowers only. The additional supporting
material shows a similar range of results. The youngest Dutch households are less likely to repay
than the oldest households in the Netherlands, but the difference is only just over 3 percent. In
Belgium, while age is not significant when looking at the difference between the upper and the
lower bound, since the 95 percent coverage regions overlap for the youngest and oldest households
(even though the point estimates do not), the results are significant when looking at the tightened
upper bound, with the youngest households between 4.5 percent and 9.5 percent more likely to
be in arrears. Similarly, in both Finland and in Slovenia, the oldest households are more likely
to repay than households aged 45 or younger. In contrast, there are no significant differences
between Luxembourg, Irish, Greek or Portuguese households at different ages. But this is not
surprising, since age was not significant when attention was restricted to borrowers only. There
is also no significant difference between age-groups in Austria when looking at credit applicants;
however, this result is more surprising since there was a difference across age-groups in Austria
when attention was restricted to those granted credit. This shows that the selection issue is a
non-trivial problem.
The comparison between income levels is shown on the right-hand side of figure 3, taking
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eleven points in the Eurozone income distribution. The effect of income is is typically larger than
the effect of age. The figure shows that at low levels of income the bounds are usually very
wide (because a large proportion of these households were refused credit), while at high levels of
income the bounds are considerably closer together. For each country, the tightened bound is
quite close to the upper bound, hence tightening the bounds in this way makes little difference
to the results. In Germany and Italy there are large and significant differences across income
groups, with the poorest households much less likely to repay. For example, in Germany, using
the tightened bounds, the poorest households are between 23 and 33 percent less likely to repay
than the highest income households while in Italy they are between 26 and 34 percent less likely
to repay. In Spain, while nevertheless significant, the differences across income-groups are smaller
(between 6.5 and 9.2 percent between the lowest and highest income households when looking at
the tightened bounds). Moreover, at every income level, Spanish households are more likely to
repay than either German or Italian households.
The additional supporting material shows that in the Netherlands, Austria and Finland, high
income households are more likely to repay their debts than middle income households, who in
turn are more likely to repay than low income households. (In the Netherlands the upper and
lower bounds are very close together, meaning the effects are very tightly estimated: the 10th
income centile are 18 percent more likely to be in arrears than the 90th Eurozone income centile).
In Belgium, households at the 10th income centile are less likely to repay than households at
the 50th or the 90th income centiles, and the very richest households more likely to repay than
median households when looking at the tightened bounds. In Ireland and in Luxembourg, high
income households are more likely to repay than middle and low income households (the difference,
using the tightened bounds, between the 10th and 90th centile is between 8 and 16 percent in
Luxembourg, and between 4 and 20 percent in Ireland). Greece shows low repayment rates at
27
all income levels, but while high income households show higher repayment rates than middle or
low income households, there is no statistically significant difference between households at lower
income levels. In Portugal, there is never a difference across income groups in their repayment
when looking at the wider bounds, but when looking at the tightened bounds, the 5th Eurozone
income centile has higher arrears than middle or higher income households.
The results for couple, university and the income shock are reported in columns 3-5 of table 2.
The table shows that couple is not significant in any of the three countries; this is not surprising
since couple had not been significant among borrowers and obviously will remain insignificant
when including rejected applicants. The effect of university remains significant in Italy and Spain,
but including rejected households means the effect of university becomes insignificant Germany.
Looking at the tightened bounds, university reduces repayment by between just under 2 percent
and 5 percent in Italy; and by around 1.5 percent in Spain. The results of the income shock
remain significant among credit applicants in all three countries reported in table 2. In Germany
the income shock reduces repayment by 5.4-9.8 percent, in Italy by 3.9-9.0 percent, and in Spain
by 7.2-7.9 percent. The results are similar in those countries whose results are reported in the
additional supporting material. The effect of couple remains significant only in Finland, while the
effect of university remains significant in Belgium (where it raises arrears by between 4.4 percent
and 8.8 percent) and in Slovenia (where the estimated effect is between 3 and 4 percent). The effect
of the income shock are significant in most countries; in Belgium, the Netherlands, Finland and
Luxembourg the income shock increases arrears by over 10 percent, but is much smaller in Ireland,
Austria and Slovenia. In Portugal and in Greece, the income shock does not have a significant effect
on repayment (although the tightened upper and the lower bounds do not overlap in Portugal, the
95 percent coverage regions do overlap).
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5.4 An Estimate of the Underlying Propensity to Repay
Arguably, the most important quantity to estimate is the underlying propensity to repay among
all households, which includes those households that do not apply for credit. For example, in order
to estimate the effect of changes in the policy environment on arrears we need some assessment of
how the pool of applicants changes as policy changes. The policy relevant estimate thus requires
an assessment of the underlying propensity to repay among all households regardless of whether
the household made an application for credit, or if that application was accepted. An upper and a
lower bound on the propensity to repay can be constructed by assuming all non-borrowers would
have repaid (for the upper bound θu), or that they would all have experienced arrears (for the lower
bound θl). Estimates for these bounds are shown using a dashed line in figure 4. The last four
columns of table 2 also present the upper and the lower bounds for the estimates of arrears (and
the associated bootstrapped 95 percent coverage regions). A problem, however, is that the bounds
(and the associated coverage regions) are typically rather wide. This means the coverage regions
invariably overlap when we compare the highest and lowest income households; when we compare
the oldest and the youngest households; when we compare married to single households, whether
the household is university educated, or if it suffers a negative income shock. Consequently, for all
countries (including those for which results are only reported in the online supplementary material),
the estimates of the effect of the five variables are never significant when using the upper and the
lower bound.
To tighten these bounds we can assume that rejected households are weakly less likely to repay
than households whose application was accepted, and that non-applicant households are weakly
more likely to repay had they received a loan than those households who actually received credit.
Note that using the alternative assumption, that credit applicants are weakly worse risks than
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non-applicants (e.g. using θbl (x) rather than θtl(x) for the tightened lower bound) gives very similar
results. Results for the tightened upper bound θtu(x) and the tightened lower bound θtl(x) are
shown in table 2, and displayed in figure 4 as solid lines. Tightening the bounds (particularly
tightening the lower bound) makes a substantial difference as they narrow the coverage regions and
allow the effect of the variables to be significant. Hence we will concentrate on describing these
results.
The tightened upper bound and tightened lower bound on the effect of age on the underlying
propensity to default are shown with solid lines on the left-hand side of figure 4. In Spain the
youngest households are significantly more likely to experience arrears than the oldest households,
with the effect estimated to be between 4.7 and 5.5 percent. However, age is not significant in
either Germany or Italy. The effect of income is shown on the right-hand side of figure 4. German
households at the 10th centile of the Eurozone income distribution are significantly different from
middle-income households, which (comparing the 40th to the 95th centile) are significantly different
from high income households. In Italy, only the very richest households are less likely to be in
arrears than the very poorest households. In Spain, while the point estimates of the tightened
upper and tightened lower bounds do not overlap when comparing the high income and the low
income households, the 95 percent coverage regions do overlap, and hence we can not confirm than
income has a significant affect on arrears. The results in last four columns of table 2 show that
neither couple nor university are significant for any of the three countries included in the table.
However, the income shock significantly reduces repayment among Spanish households, where the
size of the effect is estimated to be between 5.9 and 8.2 percent.
The results for those countries reported in the supplementary material are similar. The only
country for which age is significant is Finland (where the youngest households are 7.4-12.2 percent
more likely to be in arrears than the oldest households). In contrast, most countries show significant
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differences between different income groups. The exceptions are the Netherlands, Ireland and
Portugal, since although the point estimates of the tightened upper and tightened lower bounds
do not overlap when comparing the high income and the low income households, the 95 percent
coverage regions do overlap, and hence we can not confirm than income has a significant affect on
arrears in these countries. The income shock is only significant in the Netherland and Finland,
where the size of the effect is between 6.5-14.3 percent in the Netherlands, and 13.4-20.5 percent
in Finland. The results reported in this section contrast with the naive estimates (which implicitly
assume that non-borrowers would have repaid), or with the estimates using only borrowers, showing
the importance of the key assumptions contained in those estimates if they are to be interpreted
as estimates of the underlying repayment behaviour of households.
5.5 Differences Across Eurozone Countries
Having estimated the underlying propensity to repay in different Eurozone countries, we can in-
vestigate whether there are differences in the propensity to repay between particular countries. If
we concentrate on the tightened upper bound and the tightened lower bound, we find there is no
difference in the propensity to repay of households in Germany and households in Italy at each age
level and each income level. However, German households differ from Spanish households. Our
estimates show that for middle-aged and older households, German households are more likely to
experience arrears than Spanish households (the confidence region does not overlap for households
between the ages of 45 and 57). There are also differences across income groups: Spanish house-
holds are more likely to repay on schedule than German households for those households between
the 10th and the 70th centiles of the Eurozone income distribution. Similarly, German households
are also more likely to repay than Greek households for households between the 30th and 80th
centile of the income distribution and at all age-groups from age 33 to age 60. These results affirm
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that differences in behaviour between countries play an important role in explaining arrears.
6 Conclusion
Several papers have estimated the factors causing households to experience arrears. Many studies
have used survey data on a random sample of the population; others have used administrative data
provided by a lender. This paper discusses the different estimates that are current in the literature.
We believe there is considerable confusion over the interpretation of these different estimates,
because each makes important (and implausible) assumptions about households who do not receive
a loan. Naive estimates of repayment are typically obtained with representative samples of the
household population and make silent the assumption that households who do not receive credit
would have repaid their debts had they had credit. Estimates relying on lenders administrative
records typically ignore those households who are refused credit, and hence implicitly assume they
behave exactly like those given credit. Because these estimates ignore the selection problem (as not
all households currently borrow), both estimates are likely to seriously over-estimate the repayment
of households. Just as seriously, because the implicit assumptions behind each of these estimates
differs, the estimates will also differ, even when both purport to estimate the same underlying
probability of arrears.
This paper discusses how to construct several different estimates of arrears, which have im-
portant, albeit different, economic interpretations. The simplest estimate is a calculation of the
probability of arrears among existing borrowers, which is important when lenders want to manage
the risk profile of their outstanding loans. A second useful estimate arises when the bank makes
their lending decision and thus wants to construct an estimate of the likely arrears behaviour of
credit applicants. Lastly, and a key contribution of this paper, the policy-maker wants to know
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how changes in the regulatory environment will change the underlying propensity to default of
households. (As an example, the US policy debate on the role of lending criteria contained in
Foote et al., 2010, recognized that the lender’s decision to foreclose was endogenous, but ignored
the endogeneity of the original decision to lend). While there are several attempts in the literature
to properly estimate the propensity to arrears among loan applicants (see Boyes, Hoffman, and
Low 1989, Karlan and Zinman 2009, or Grant and Padula 2013), to the best of our knowledge,
no previous paper has estimated the underlying propensity to repay using household survey data,
which accounts for applicant and lender behaviour. The paper which comes nearest to capturing
our concept of the propensity to default is Guiso et al. (2013), who try to capture this underly-
ing propensity to default by asking hypothetical questions to a random sample of US households,
and changing the household’s hypothetical circumstances; but they restricted attention to existing
homeowners, while our study explores the underlying arrears behaviour of the household regardless
of whether the household has a loan.
This paper uses data from EU-SILC to construct estimates of each of the different quantities
that have previously been reported in the literature on default, before it constructs bounds on the
true incidence of arrears among credit applicants and among the whole population. Moreover, it
discusses how simple, and plausible, assumptions about the behaviour of lenders and borrowers
can narrow these bounds. When estimating the propensity to default, assuming rejected applicants
are less likely to repay than accepted households tightens the upper bound, while assuming that
households who received credit are weakly less likely to default than households who did not apply
tightens the lower bound. An alternative, and easily implementable assumption that tightens
the lower bound is to assume that credit applicants are weakly more likely to default than non-
applicants. In this case, the tightened lower bound will be the same as the lower bound used for
the estimate using applicant data only.
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Our estimates focus on the effect of age, income, couple, a university education and an income
shock on repayment. We show that the existing literature is likely to draw incorrect inference about
default behaviour, and to over-estimate how likely households are to repay. The level of arrears is
an important variable if, for example, lenders are deciding which households should receive credit;
or government wants to know the likely costs of supporting debtor households when the regulatory
environment changes. The paper also shows that the importance of explanatory variables is likely to
be mis-understood: our results for the Eurozone countries, for example, showed that using the naive
estimate (which assumes all non-borrowers would have repaid), university educated households are
less likely to experience arrears, but the true estimate of the underlying propensity to repay showed
that university was no longer significant. Our results also showed that there were differences in the
underlying propensity to default between German and Spanish households (e.g. after accounting
for the selection effects involved in the decision to apply and to lend). This suggests that policy
may have to be different in the two countries to account for differences in underlying behaviour. It
also suggests that future research could usefully try to explain these differences between countries.
Finally, we hope this paper motivates researchers and policy-makers to give considerably more
thought to what exactly they are estimating, and to what they exactly want to estimate. In
particular, our results suggest there should be more attention given to how the propensity to
default is inferred from actual arrears. For example, the lender, when computing the value-at-risk
(relevant to regulators under the Basel accord), wants to know arrears among current borrowers;
but when making the lending decision, it wants to know the rate of arrears among applicants.
Policy-makers want to know how policy affects default behaviour in the whole population (as well
as how lenders will change their lending behaviour is response to changes in policy). Hence the key
estimate of interest, when discussing policy changes, is to understand the underlying propensity
to default (even if the other estimates are also potentially sensitive to these changes). We believe
34
future research investigating arrears should, if it wants to be useful, be clear about which of these
problems the estimate is attempting to address.
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Table 1. Summary Statistics
All Borrowers Borrowers
Households Who Repay In Arrears
mean sd mean sd mean sd
income 30,828 25,590 35,296 28,205 20,384 15,437
age 44.9 8.5 44.7 8.4 43.4 8.1
couple 0.72 0.44 0.76 0.42 0.62 0.48
university 0.31 0.47 0.38 0.49 0.21 0.41




Note: Authors own calculations using 2008 wave of EU-SILC. Income is defined as the sum
of labour income and transfers, less labour taxes (measured in annual euros). The table also
reports the proportion of households headed by a couple, where the head attended university,
and which reported a significant fall in income.
Table 2. Estimates of Repayment in Germany, Spain and Italy
Naive Borrow Applicants Propensity
Upper Tight Lower Upper Tight Tight Lower
Bound Upper Bound Bound Upper Lower Bound
Country: Germany
Couple
0 94.75 93.25 93.47 93.25 90.23 94.72 94.55 90.80 72.64
[95.63 93.87] [94.38 92.12] [94.56 [94.38 88.93] [96.49 [96.36 88.31] 69.10]
1 94.65 93.24 93.34 93.24 91.77 94.62 94.54 92.02 73.71
[95.30 94.00] [94.06 92.42] [94.14 [94.06 90.89] [95.91 [95.85 90.37] 71.20]
Income Shock
0 94.66 93.23 93.34 93.23 91.77 94.62 94.54 92.02 73.70
[95.30 94.01] [94.04 92.43] [94.14 [94.04 90.89] [95.91 [95.84 90.38] 71.19]
1 88.94 86.38 86.85 86.38 83.42 88.83 88.44 83.75 69.93
[90.80 87.08] [88.62 84.14] [89.04 [88.62 81.01] [92.68 [92.39 78.97] 64.64]
University
0 94.66 93.24 93.34 93.24 91.77 94.63 94.54 92.02 73.72
[95.30 94.01] [94.04 92.43] [94.14 [94.04 90.89] [95.92 [95.85 90.38] 71.20]
1 96.51 95.56 95.57 95.56 94.58 96.46 96.42 94.74 75.42
[97.13 95.89] [96.35 94.78] [96.36 [96.35 93.72] [97.68 [97.66 93.09] 72.55]
Country: Italy
Couple
0 96.66 93.62 93.75 93.62 92.51 96.53 96.49 92.77 48.86
[97.31 96.00] [94.83 92.41] [94.95 [94.83 91.22] [97.82 [97.79 90.33] 44.89]
1 95.78 92.29 92.49 92.29 90.42 95.61 95.52 90.92 50.40
[96.21 95.36] [93.05 91.54] [93.23 [93.05 89.59] [96.58 [96.51 89.18] 47.96]
Income Shock
0 95.79 92.33 92.44 92.33 90.40 95.58 95.49 90.90 50.29
[96.21 95.37] [93.09 91.57] [93.18 [93.09 89.57] [96.47 [96.40 89.28] 48.08]
1 91.52 85.50 86.02 85.50 83.31 92.02 91.80 84.89 49.99
[92.34 90.71] [86.85 84.15] [87.32 [86.85 81.90] [93.45 [93.27 82.51] 47.39]
University
0 94.34 91.84 92.02 91.84 89.81 94.80 94.66 90.77 63.32
[94.91 93.77] [92.65 91.02] [92.81 [92.65 88.93] [95.43 [95.41 88.78] 62.41]
1 95.78 94.75 94.82 94.75 93.86 96.05 95.99 93.76 73.57
[96.54 95.01] [95.71 93.79] [95.76 [95.71 92.84] [96.79 [96.74 92.91] 71.68]
Country: Spain
Couple
0 97.52 97.13 97.16 97.13 97.01 97.53 97.53 97.11 85.08
[98.65 96.38] [98.41 95.84] [98.45 [98.41 95.70] [99.06 [99.06 95.35] 81.42]
1 97.71 97.33 97.35 97.33 97.13 97.70 97.69 97.19 84.20
[98.14 97.29] [97.82 96.84] [97.84 [97.82 96.63] [98.54 [98.54 96.19] 82.09]
Income Shock
0 97.71 97.33 97.34 97.33 97.16 97.66 97.65 97.15 84.12
[98.13 97.28] [97.82 96.85] [97.82 [97.82 96.66] [98.49 [98.49 96.17] 82.06]
1 91.24 89.96 90.01 89.96 89.40 91.26 91.20 89.46 78.63
[92.49 89.99] [91.36 88.55] [91.40 [91.36 87.96] [93.83 [93.79 86.46] 75.20]
University
0 97.71 97.32 97.30 97.32 97.17 97.69 97.69 97.18 84.15
[98.14 97.29] [97.81 96.84] [97.79 [97.81 96.66] [98.53 [98.52 96.19] 82.06]
1 98.97 98.88 98.87 98.88 98.87 98.95 98.95 98.84 91.18
[99.35 98.59] [99.28 98.48] [99.27 [99.28 98.46] [99.59 [99.59 98.14] 88.97]
Note: The naive estimate assumes that all those households who do not have credit would have repaid their
debts. The second column looks at arrears among households who actually receive credit. For the estimates of
the propensity to repay among credit applicants, the upper bound assumes all applicants refused credit would
repay; the lower bound assumes all applicants refused credit would not repay; the tightened upper bound assumes
the applicants refused credit are weakly less likely to repay than applicants given credit. For the estimates of the
propensity to repay among all households, the upper bound assumes all households without credit would repay;
the lower bound assumes all applicants without credit would not repay. The 95 percent confidence interval or
confidence region is shown in brackets below the estimates.













































































Note: Solid lines show the kernel estimates of the naive estimate of the percentage of households that repay (vertical
axis) which assumes households who do not have a loan would have repaid. The left-hand side shows the effect of
age on repayment, while the right-hand side shows the effect of income. Estimates for income are at eleven centiles
of the Eurozone income distribution (where log-annual income/10000 is marked on the horizontal axis). Confidence
intervals are drawn with dashed lines.













































































Note: Solid lines show the kernel estimates of the percentage of households that repay (vertical axis) among borrowers.
The left-hand side shows the effect of age on repayment, while the right-hand side shows the effect of income. Estimates
for income are at eleven centiles of the Eurozone income distribution (where log-annual income/10000 is marked on
the horizontal axis). Confidence intervals are dashed.













































































Note: These figures report kernel estimates of the propensity to repay (vertical axis) among credit applicants. The
left-hand side shows the effect of age on repayment, while the right-hand side shows the effect of income. Estimates
for income are at eleven centiles of the Eurozone income distribution (where log-annual income/10000 is marked on
the horizontal axis). Solid lines show upper, tightened upper, and lower bounds for the estimates (confidence regions
are dashed).















































































Note: These figures report kernel estimates of the underlying propensity to repay (vertical axis) among all households.
The left-hand side shows the effect of age on repayment, while the right-hand side shows the effect of income. Estimates
for income are at eleven centiles of the Eurozone income distribution (where log-annual income/10000 is marked on
the horizontal axis). Dashed lines show basic estimates of upper and lower bounds, solid lines show tightened upper
and tightened lower bounds.
